Divinity, Humanity, and Incarnation 3

In reading through Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy this evening, I received just the spark I needed to bring this series to an end (and perhaps even a new beginning?). Using the motif of a courtroom, Brueggemann interprets the polyphonic nature of the Old Testament as a cacophony of witnesses testifying about YHWH. I am in the section where Brueggemann discuses Israel’s countertestimony. Here is a snippet that explains how Brueggemann understands Israel’s countertestimony:

Thus, while my extended discussion of cross-examination runs counter to my extended discussion of testimony, it is not a case of either/or. The cross-examination is not intended by Israel to obliterate the core testimony. In the disputatious propensity of Israel, rather, core testimony and cross-examination belong to each other and for each other in an ongoing exchange. Thus there will never be a “final” testimony in Israel that will not be subject to cross-examination. Nor will there ever be a cross-examination to which the consensus testimony does not make a vigorous response. Thus a reader of the Old Testament, I suggest, must accept cross-examination as a crucial part of the way in which Israel makes its presentation of disputatious testimony concerning Yahweh. It does not know any other way to speak. As a result, it is evident that Israel’s countertestimony is not an act of unfaith. It is rather a characteristic way in which faith is practiced. (317-18)

On a cross-examination of YHWH’s reliability, Brueggemann finds in the narratives of Samuel, Saul, and David, evidence certain (counter)testimonies, one of which includes YHWH’s willingness to “deceive in order to advance David (1 Sam 16:1)” (371). He adds to this the Davidic census which YHWH both incites and condemns (2 Sam 24). Earlier, he discusses the prophetic tale in 1 Kings 22:20-22 where YHWH devises a strategy “to entice Ahab into fullish policy by a prophet who is credentialed by Yahweh to give bad advice to the king. . . . What is being planned is a massive deception of the king” (361).

If these voices were not challenging enough for discerning a coherent Old Testament theological image of YHWH, the challenge only increases when we expand our scope to address the biblical theological testimony about God. Consider the words of James. “Let no one say when he is tempted, ‘I am being tempted by God,’ for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one” (1:13). Perhaps such a verse demonstrates Brueggemann’s own contention that “there will never be a ‘final’ testimony in Israel that will not be subject to cross-examination. Nor will there ever be a cross-examination to which the consensus testimony does not make a vigorous response.”

I want to use this verse as the fulcrum into my discussion on Divinity, Humanity, and Incarnation. The previous discussion can be found here and here. If certain verses in the Old Testament serve as a countertestimony to James’ contention that God “tempts no one” (or perhaps if James serves as a countertestimony to the narratives of Samuel, Saul, and David), then the Gospels and the letter to the Hebrews might be considered a countertestimony to the James’ contention that “God cannot be tempted with evil.”

The synoptic gospels, particularly Matthew and Luke, have no shame in portraying Jesus in the wilderness tempted by Satan. While the whole event is surely a recapitulation of Exodus, the three temptations seem to also reflect the temptation Eve faces in the Garden (Gen 3:6). These become in the New Testament the three-fold understanding of temptation. “For all that is in the world- the desires of the flesh and the desires of the eyes and pride in possessions- is not from the Father but is from the world” (1 John 2:16). (Again, we detect here the desire to distance such things from the Father, the other concern which James shares.) One can see the author of Hebrews making use of the synoptic temptation story along with this three-fold nature of temptation as he reflects on the priestly role of Jesus. “For we do not have a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin” (Hebrews 4:15).

What do we do with this testimony in the Gospels and Hebrews regarding the Jesus experiencing temptation? Do we dismiss his divinity? Do we exalt his humanity? The latter move would be, in my opinion, the type of move made in kenotic Christology. Thus, in order for divinity to be clothed in humanity, in order for incarnation to be possible, the divinity must in some way “empty himself” of certain things which characterize his divinity (i.e. divinity cannot be tempted with evil).

Along with Brueggemann, I question whether we should make a move that provides the interpretive finality our Western minds so desperately crave. Is this type of tension not elsewhere tolerated in our Bible? Observe Habakkuk in the span of a single verse make a claim about YHWH’s nature and then provide an instance in which YHWH is seen acting in opposition to that claim. “You who are of purer eyes than to see evil and cannot look (nbt) at wrong, why do you idly look (nbt) at traitors and are silent when the wicked swallows up the man more righteous than he?” (Hab 1:13). Kenotic Christology does nothing to resolve the tension here in Habakkuk, and using it to reconcile one tension in Scripture places a heavy burden on the rest of Scripture where similar tension can be found.

Is it a necessary (or even an expedient) move to resolve the type of tension outlined above? At this point, I am inclined to say no. To resolve the tension in one place would place a burden in every such place where similar tension exists in Scripture. How does one reconcile a verse like Habakkuk 1:13? We could call it hyperbolic language, but that then brings into question the reliability of any such claims about YHWH/God. Perhaps James was merely speaking hyperbolically!  To recognize the tension, to choose to leave the tension alone is by no means the end of the interpretive enterprise. It is only the launching point, the place where we begin our theological inquiry.

What do you think? Should we leave the tension alone? Should we seek to resolve it?

References

Brueggemann, Walter. Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997.

Divinity, Humanity, and the Incarnation 2

I began my last post with the story of the Christian apologist who responded to the atheist’s question “What does it mean to say ‘God is spirit’” by talking about the incorporeality of God. The apologist appealed to Greek metaphysics to explain Jesus’ words to the atheist, a move completely unwarranted by the text of John’s gospel, but not necessarily foreign to a classical Christian understanding of God.

I have found it to be a common Christian assumption that God is incorporeal. This, of course, breaks down when the discussion begins to focus on Jesus. The incarnation of Jesus requires Christians to develop doctrines that can help reconcile what they assume/confess with what is presented in Scripture. This often means that certain passages of Scripture are used to serve concerns introduced by the assumptions of the modern interpreter, concerns that likely were not a part of the ancient writers who penned the texts. In my last post, I mentioned that I regard Phil 2:6-11 and the concept of kenotic Christology as an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the assumption of God’s incorporeality with the biblical testimony of Jesus’ incarnation.

Both Paul and the author of Hebrews share a remarkably similar conviction about Jesus as a revelation of God. “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation” (Colossians 1:15). “He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature” (Hebrews 1:3).  What would it look like theologically to take these claims at face value? What are the theological ramifications of saying, as Jesus said, “Whoever has seen me [Jesus] has seen the Father” (John 14:9)? These types of verses seem to argue for greater continuity between the image of Jesus we gather from the pages of the New Testament and the image we are to have of God.

The type of move I see Paul and the author of Hebrews (not to mention Jesus himself) encouraging us to make from the gospel story is not to far removed from what I have posted Brueggemann saying both here and especially here. I have also quoted Peter Enns in a similar (if not identical) vein both here and here. God is revealed to us by Scripture and by his Son, by the word of God and by the Word of God. If we continue to find ourselves attempting to get behind what is said in the word and of the Word, then are we really being faithful to the image of God that is being revealed to us by the w/Word? I would like to join in the chorus of voices that respond negatively. I believe the incarnation itself is a key to better understanding why a “No” is appropriate to the above question, and how better we can move forward in the interpretive enterprise.

Let me use two examples: repentance and divine knowledge. Certain classical confessions reject both the idea that God can repent (or, more generally, change) and that God can himself not know something. Such confessions are typically couched in more positive language: God is immutable; God is omniscient. As general, sweeping statements, these confessions tend to interact with a selective portion of Scripture. For example, no creed would assert, “God is immutable” and then list Genesis 6:6-7 as a prooftext of that claim. Likewise, no creed would assert, “God is omniscient” and then list Genesis 18:20-21 as a prooftext of that claim. Creeds must be selective of the Scriptural prooftexts they use when they employ this terminology.

Now we could recognize these texts figuratively, something I have discussed here. But this move will challenge us as Jesus tends to model this same behavior recorded of YHWH in the Old Testament. Only, when he models this behavior, it becomes prototypical for Christian faith. His submission to a baptism of repentance is “fitting. . .to fulfill all righteousness” (Matt 3:11-17). Jesus’ knowledge (or lack thereof) regarding the time of the second coming is foundational for the Christian’s disposition toward the second coming (Mark 13:32-33). In the very least, the latter text cannot be understood figuratively. However, my main concern is not what type of literal or figurative presentation we have in these verses, but simply the fact that they communicate the very things that many Christian confessions and more frequently confessional Christians anathematize. They communicate a theology which is highly criticized if reproduced by modern scholars who are concerned with the way in which the texts themselves do theology.

If there is any sense in which we recognize Jesus to be a deeper or more precise revelation of the God of Scripture (Heb 1:1), then should we not pay extra attention to those texts concerning Jesus which rub against the grain of our confessional theologies? At what point do we finally recognize that our modern concerns have drifted from the concerns of Scripture?

Israel, lacking much of a philosophical inclination, is practically oriented and concerned with what Yahweh does ‘for us,” and so is ‘for us.’ Or it may be that in its practical modes of testimony, Israel discerned early on that the God who is the primal Character in this speech simply cannot be accommodated to such philosophical categories. That is, perhaps Israel understood, even or especially in the presence of more philosophically inclined neighbors, that Yahweh, as known in its texts, simply does not qualify as omnipotent, omniscient, or omnipresent, and so Israel does not seek to locate Yahweh in such speech that is fundamentally incongruent with who Yahweh is. (Brueggeman, Old Testament Theology, 225-26)

Whether one agrees with Brueggemann or not, one should take seriously the move that he is making. When the concerns of Scripture do not align with the concerns of classical systematic theology, we must be wary when our modern concerns lead us to speak about God in a way that challenges how the ancient writers with their ancient concerns spoke about God. Brueggemann, in his book, observes that Israel was not interested in a “testimony” about YHWH that resembles the philosophical concerns of our present day. He goes on to suggest that their “testimony” is “fundamentally incongruent” with the modern philosophical testimony popular in systematic theology.

That Brueggeman can say this about YHWH in the theology of the Old Testament, and that others like myself can make the same observation about Jesus in the theology of the New Testament should cause us to raise our eyebrows at how easily dismissed are the ancient way of speaking about God. If for no other reason, these ways of speaking deserve greater attention because it is Jesus, who incarnate is the “image of the invisible God, “the “radiance of the glory of God,” and the “exact imprint of his nature,” who is revealing God in these ways to us. The incarnate life of Jesus is not about compromising who God is, but rather it is about leading us to be like God is (Matt 5:48). It is an attempt to restore the image of God within us and to bring further harmony between God and man.

I am going to stew on these thoughts (and hopefully some postive interaction from you) and I will likely make at least one more post on this topic.

References

Brueggemann, Walter. Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997.

Divinity, Humanity, and the Incarnation

I would like to transition from my thoughts on anthropomorphic/pathic language to a discussion of the incarnation.  I believe, in light of the present theological climate, that these comments need to be discussed in chorus, something I plan to do in the course of this series of posts.

I recently heard an apologetic debate between a creationist in my own faith tradition and an evangelical preacher turned atheist. One of the questions the atheist asked the creationist was, “What does it mean, ‘God is spirit’? What is spirit?” The creationist proceeded to discuss the incorporeality of God. Had I been the evangelical preacher turned atheist, I would have responded with these two questions. “Is Jesus incorporeal?” “Is he God?”

John was not a dualist; he did not share the worldview of the Greeks. This, unfortunately, was an assumption that the creationist made. But as far as Christendom was concerned, I imagine that he is largely in the majority, if not in how John should be interpreted, in the very least, how God should be understood.

In Philippians 2:6-11, there is a highly stylized poem that (arguably) constitutes the theological core of Paul’s letter. The first half reads,

Who, though he was in the form of God (εν μορφη θεου υπαρχων), did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but made himself nothing (εαυτου εκενωσεν), taking the form of a servant (μορφην δουλου λαβων), being born in the likeness of men (εν ομοιωματι ανθρωπων γενομενος).  And being found in human form, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross.

I do not know whether systematic or exegetical concerns is to blame, but this has historically been used to explain the ontological mystery of the incarnation. Thus, εν μορφη θεου υπαρχων is understood as Jesus’ prior ontological form while μορφην δουλου λαβων is his incarnational ontology, further qualified by the phrase εν ομοιωματι ανθρωπων γενομενος. The verb εκενωσεν then marks Jesus’ ontological change. This verb has become the label for a Christiological perspective which attempts to explain away the contradictions tensions between Jesus’  incarnate life and the nature of one who is divine. He empties himself of certain divine attributes/qualities/prerogatives when he becomes a human.

If I understand correctly, Phil 2:6-11 is no longer recognized as a proof text for kenotic Christology, at least not by those who study Paul. The particular way of thinking (τουτο φρονειτε; 2:5) that Paul is exhorting his readers to model their lives after (πολιτευεσθε; 1:27) has nothing to do with Jesus’ pre- or post-incarnate ontology. Being in the form of God (εν μορφη θεου υπαρχων) concerns his being equal with God (το ειναι ισα θεω), not his ontological essence. Yet even still, I believe that the concept of kenotic Christology lives on for those who recognize a tension between Jesus’ life while incarnate and the attributes/qualities/prerogatives that pertain to one who is divine (θεος).

I am not persuaded that kenotic Christology resolves tension in the biblical text any more than it creates tension. I make my appeal to two very explicit passages about Christ. The first one says, “He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature” (Hebrews 1:3). The second one says in a similar vein, “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation” (Colossians 1:15). These verses seem to disallow the type of move made from a kenotic Christological perspective.

In my next post,  I will flesh out why I find these verses to be incongruous with kenotic Christology as well as explore potential connections between the type of Christology imbedded in these statements and how we go about doing Old Testament theology.